

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF INDIA – CHINA RELATIONS

Ritu

Assistant Professor of Political Science (Contract Basis)
MKJK College Rohtak , Haryana, India

Abstract : *During the 1950's the relations between India and China were flowery, based on the peaceful coexistence, but the Tibet issue, followed by a border dispute poisoned the climate of Sino-Indian entente cordiale. Nehru's policy of no-dispute and no-negotiation policies finally led to a border war in 1962. From then on, Sino-Indian relations entered an era of cold war which lasted nearly 20 years. However during the era of Rajiv Gandhi (1988), the tension between the two countries was minimized and initiatives were taken for improvement in the relations. The continuous visits between the heads of state and officials have strengthened the relations and various issues including the border issue have been in the discussion for resolution by mutual cooperation. For instance, there is a divergence of interests between the two like the border disputes, water disputes etc. In this paper attempt has been made to trace the history of Sino-Indian relations.*

Keywords : India, China, Relations, Conflict, Cooperation, Panchsheel.

1. INTRODUCTION :

India—China relations have undergone dramatic changes over the past five decades, ranging from the 1950's with a deep hostility in the 1960's and 1970's to a rapprochement in the 1980's and a readjustment since the demise of Soviet Union. The post-cold war era has offered enormous opportunities to New Delhi and Beijing to move in the direction of a 'productive relationship'. Both countries have realized the imperative need for cooperation in diverse areas, especially in the trade and economic domains, in the long-term interest of peace and stability in Asia as well as for faster economic development and prosperity at home. During Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to China in June 2003, leaders of both countries not only emphasized the categorical need to deepen economic, trade and strategic ties, but also the need to explore a feasible framework for an early settlement of border question, which has been a contentious issue for more than four decades. Realistically, the fast-changing economic and strategic milieu punctuated by uncertainty brought about by globalization in macrocosmic terms, has created challenges as well as opportunities for both India and China to free themselves of 'historical baggage' in terms of bilateral relations. In this research paper attempt would be made to give a brief study of Sino-Indian relations from the early 1950 to the present.

2. OBJECTIVES :

- To study the India –China relations
- To study the challenges and problems in the trust building between the two nations.
- To study the role of political leadership in creating relation between India and China.

3. METHODOLOGY: This paper is descriptive only. For this paper, data has been collected from secondary sources. This paper analyses about the India – China relations .

4. FINDINGS:

FIRST STAGE OF RELATIONS:-

The anti-imperialistic efflorescence of the Indian and Chinese people manifested in a major way as a challenge to the colonial order for the first time during the First War of Indian Independence (1857-59) in India and the Taiping Uprising (1850—1864) in China. The reaction of Chinese and Indian people against their common enemy was the same. For the first time Indian soldiers were stationed in China and switched over to the Taipings and fought shoulder to shoulder against imperialists and Qing government. It was due to the synergy between the cultures of India and China that the nationalists and revolutionaries of India and China developed deep mutual contact that turned into friendship amidst their anti-imperialist struggle. They became the natural allies and used various ways to remove the intruder. They supported the Tilak, the leaders of militant nationalists, carried out activities like Shivaji's commemorative meetings as far as Tokyo in to make the Indian voice of anti-imperialism reach outside India. . Besides the nationalists like Borohan, Surendermohan Bose, Rash Behari Bose, M.N Roy, Barakatullah, Lala Lajpat Rai, and many others outstanding pioneers of Indian freedom movement maintained good contacts and friendship with Sun Yat-Sen who whole heartedly supported the Indian cause and rendered all possible help to them. With the rise of Gandhi in Indian politics, the entire Indian freedom movement turned into a mass movement. He took spiritual world order or spiritual management of society and worked to bring in order through civilized means such as Satyagraha and ahimsa. He made nonviolence his principle, creed and never compromised with it. He was upheld by Chinese people

as a symbol of 'eastern civilization' who manifested himself to represent this civilization in various shapes and forms. The Chinese media paid utmost attention and widely covered the Indian freedom struggle in various newspapers and journals. A new chapter was written in the history of Sino-Indian relations during the war of Resistance and Second World War. So long as China suffered at the hands of Japanese, the reverberation affected India also. India dispatched a medical mission to China in 1938 to help them in their War of Resistance. Nehru made bonds of friendship even stronger when he visited China in 1939. The period from 1905—1947 was the period when both the people of India and China rendered support and sympathy to each other in their common struggle. It was Nehru's vision that in future India and China would necessarily come nearer to each other for the vast and tremendous potentials of economic cooperation in the New World after the war. The period from 1947 onwards the post liberation history of Sino-Indian relations has been that of friendship, setback and normalization. India was the first country in non-communist bloc to recognize China and establish diplomatic relations. India attained independence on 15 August 1947 after a long and nonviolent nationalist movement. China attained independence on October 1949 in the culmination of Chinese Civil War (1945-1949). There was a brief period of cooperation from 1949—1957 where diplomatic relations were formally established (1 April 1950) and high-level visits were exchanged. Nehru greeted the birth of communist China in October with great pomp. In a rare gesture, India displayed excessive zeal in prompting its membership in United Nations. Nehru did not share the American perception that communism was a threat to world peace and stability. On the contrary, he believed that Western hatred of communism might boomerang, since nationalism in China was stronger than communism. The early phase of Sino-Indian relations was marked by a close warm friendship, despite China's military takeover of Tibet in 1950. Although the Indian government did not register a serious protest with Beijing, opposition leaders in parliament criticized Nehru's policy on the Tibetan issue but he remained unmoved. He preferred to deal with monolithic China diplomatically by keeping it in check, and isolating it from USSR rather than coming into open confrontation with it. This strategy paid off. India was able to maintain peace and tranquility on its northeastern borders for over a decade. In 1954, India and China signed an agreement on trade and intercourse between the Tibet region of China and had an exchange of notes. India thus signed away all its inherited privileges in Tibet by virtue of earlier pacts. The five Principles of Peaceful Co existence (Panchsheel) and the Bandung Conference were highlights of Sino-Indian cooperation. However, the cooperation was not to last. By late 1950s, serious differences between the two states had begun to surface, particularly over the undemarcated border. The unresolved border issue would lead to war by 1962. Zhou Enlai refused categorically to accept the McMahon line as the final line of the border demarcation between India and PRC. To counter the Indian claim that Beijing had, in the past, never contested the legality of McMahon line, China argued that local Tibetan authorities 'had no legality with the McMahon line, China argued that local Tibetan authorities had no legal rights to conclude any border treaty with the British. Moreover, China regarded the disputed Aksai China area as part of the Chinese province of Sinkiang and not Tibet. To the contrary, India contested that —Chinese maps had never shown Sinkiang to extend south of the Kuentun range, which separated it from Tibet. Ultimately, border clashes led to the Sino-Indian war in October 1962. India's crushing defeat at the hands of the Chinese shattered Nehru's image at home and abroad.

SECOND STAGE OF RELATIONS: Between 1962 and 1969, Sino-Indian relations remained in a deep freeze. Emboldened by its easy victory over India, China initiated a vitriolic and vituperative propaganda against India, which deepened India's suspicion of China even further. India's mistrust about China was further confirmed when China befriended Pakistan and started to extend military and political support to it. China on the contrary essentially saw Indo Soviet friendship as an anti-China ploy. In the wake of humiliating defeat, when India accorded high priority to its armed forces, China accused India of —militarism. According to Wang's study Nehru hated China for not giving him a —face and —betraying his friendship. He also grudged that the —sword in his hands was not sharp enough; while the —betrayal was beyond his control. However, the —sword could be sharpened by strengthening the national defenses'. Wang asserts that it was under these circumstances that —militarism raised its head in India after the 1962 War. India saw it necessary to strengthen its armed forces in aftermath of 1962 debacle. When India sought the US and Soviet support, India was leveled as a stooge of the US imperialism and Soviet revisionism and social imperialism. From the mid-1966 onwards, the internal conditions of both India and China were in a state of continuous flux. China was in the midst of socio-economic upheaval and acute leadership struggle during the Cultural Revolution phase (1966-69). The new Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi was an untried and untested leader. Besides she faced many problems, like famines due to widespread drought. In 1967 parliamentary elections severely weakened the central leadership, where the ruling congress party of Mrs. Gandhi was returned to power with reduced majority. Chinese foreign policy remained dormant during the phase of Cultural Revolution but this did not stop the Chinese from extending its support to the so-called national liberation movement in the third world by exhorting them to replace the legitimate regimes. Accordingly, China started exploiting two basic weaknesses in the government of India. One was the inability to integrate the tribal peoples of the northeast into the mainstream of Indian life. Another was the failure to ameliorate the condition of the rural peasantry and landless laborers in the lower Ganges Valley. Sensing the weakness as an opportunity, China openly supported Naga and Mizo insurgents and encouraged them to rise in revolution against India. The Naxalbari uprising in West Bengal provided a golden opportunity to the Chinese

to recommend the Maoist path for the Indian revolutionaries. India-China relations further deteriorated in June 1967 with the expulsion of two Indian diplomats from Beijing on alleged charges of —espionage activities.

The winter of 1967 witnessed skirmishes on India-China border. On 11 September, Chinese troops attacked Indian troops on the Sikkim border across the Nathual and opened heavy mortar and artillery fire. After repeated Indian protest and proposal for ceasefire, by 15 September there was a virtual cessation of all hostile activities. The Chinese again fired heavily on the Indian positions at Chola, on 1 October and both sides suffered casualties. Thus the condition between the two countries continued to deteriorates. Mrs. Gandhi, kept striving to normalize relations with Beijing, by the end of 1967, in a discussion on external affairs, Mrs. Gandhi stated:

“China continues to maintain an attitude of hostility towards us—carries and anti-Indian propaganda not only against the Indian Government but against the whole of our democratic functioning and even our national integrity. But I would like to say that we do not harbor any evil intention towards the Chinese people, and we do hope that a day will come when they will also realize that it is in the interests of all the countries of South East Asia that we should be friends and that each country should be able to devote its strength to solving the very major problem of combating poverty and backwardness”. This was a flex approach adopted by Mrs. Gandhi regarding relations with China. Time and again the Indian government tried to establish healthy relations with China. In an address to parliament on 20 February 1970, the President reiterated his government’s desire to conduct its relations with China on the —principle of mutual respect of each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference. We expect China to respect our rights to pursue own domestic affairs and foreign policy. During the 1970s Pakistan’s problem between East and West Pakistan, China not only supported the military junta and its role in East Pakistan but also tried discreetly to moderate Yahya Khan’s brutal policy towards East Pakistan but without success. China alleged that —Weighed down with difficulties at home and abroad, the reactionary Indian government has embarked on a mad course of arms expansion and war preparations—to carry out an expansionist policy towards its neighbor. China continued to step up friendly acts against India. continued to step up friendly acts against India.

THIRD STAGE OF RELATIONS: India-China relations entered into a new phase with the path-breaking visit to Beijing in December 1988. This visit to China saw a significant improvement in India Chinese relations. Following his visit, Sino-Indian relation became more cordial that at any time since mid-1950’s. China’s close relation with Pakistan has been very important to Beijing. It is a long standing friendship that has been, as the Chinese and Pakistanis like to say, —tested by adversity, which has come in the form of regime changes and upheavals in both countries, fundamental realignments in the international system, and war. Pakistan played a major role in China’s strategy for coping with India and following the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, with the Soviet Union. Rajiv Gandhi’s December 1988 visit to China was judged a success by both sides. As the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister to China since J L Nehru’s 1954 visit, Gandhi’s visit helped balance the score in terms of summit visits. Gandhi formally notified China’s leaders of the new thrust of India’s China policy and indicated a willingness to increase consultation and cooperation with China on a range of international issues, such as the creation of a New International Economic Order, disarmament, and pollution. New Delhi’s willingness to cooperate with China on such global issues (which we may perhaps call macro diplomatic cooperation) represented acceptance of Chinese proposal that had been on the table since the early 1980s. The idea behind macro diplomatic cooperation is that, as large developing countries with long histories, China and India share many important characteristics and common interests. Moreover, by cooperating on these issues, the two countries will create an important atmosphere conducive to better bilateral relations. . Gandhi during his visit set the tone by declaring, —it is now time to look to the future, I have come to renew an old friendship. Deng Xiaoping, the top Chinese leader said that —China and India should forget the unpleasant past and set their eyes on future. Premier Li Peng was Rajiv Gandhi’s major interlocutor during the visit, and their discussion focused on the substantive issue of the border, Tibet, bilateral relations and international situation. Premier Li accepted Gandhi’s invitation to play a return visit to India. During the visit the two sides had in-depth discussions —on the Sino-Indian border questions and agreed to settle it through peaceful and friendly consultations. In December, India and China decided to set up a Joint Working Group (JWG) on the boundary issue headed by Foreign Secretary on the Indian side and a Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs on the Chinese side. The JWG was set up a step forward from that of official level in that it had joint mandate. The JWG had two important functions.

First, the JWG was to make concrete recommendations for the overall solution of the boundary question. Secondly, the group would ensure the peace and tranquility was maintained in the Line of Actual Control. The two sides also agreed to develop relations in other fields and set up a joint group on economic relations and trade, as well as science and technology. The two countries signed three accords on cultural scientific and technological cooperation as well as civil aviation.

Following Rajiv Gandhi’s China visit, the Chinese Premier Li Peng paid a return visit to India in December 1991. The joint Communiqué issued at the end of the visit stressed that —the boundary questions should not affect the development of bilateral relations. The JWG on the boundary question should step up its work and peace and tranquility should be maintained along the line of actual control pending the final settlement of the boundary question.

FORTH STAGE OF RELATIONS : In May 1992 Indian President Venkataraman visited China. Between December 1988 and June 1993, six rounds of JWC meetings on the border were held. Progress was made in reducing border tension through Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), including mutual troop reductions, regular meetings of local military commanders and advance notification of military exercises. Border trade resumed in July 1992, after an interval of more than 30 years, and consulates reopened in Bombay and Sahnghai in December 1992. Sharad Pawar visited China the same month—the first such visit of an Indian defense Minister—when the two defense establishments agreed to develop academic, military, scientific and technological exchanges to schedule and Indian port call by a Chinese naval vessel. In 1993, the two sides agreed to open an additional border trading post. Prime Minister Narsima Rao's visit to China in September 1993 saw the conclusion of the Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility in Border Areas along the LAC. A senior level Chinese military delegation made six-day goodwill visit to India in the following December, aimed at 'fostering CBMs between the defense forces of two countries'. In 1994 the two countries signed agreement on avoiding double taxation, and an agreement for cooperation on health and medical science, MoUs on simplifying the procedure for visa application, and banking cooperation between the two countries was also signed. In the beginning of the year, Beijing announced that it not only favoured a negotiated settlement on Kashmir but also opposed any form of independence for the region. Bilateral talks held at New Delhi (February 1994) confirmed the 'established CBMs and the ongoing discussion on clarification of the LAC, reduction of armed forces along the LAC and prior information about forthcoming military exercise. The outcome of President Jiang Zemin's visit to India in November-December 1996 was notable for the agreement on CBMs in military field in the border areas along the LAC, which covered troop reduction and weapons limitation along the borders. Both sides reaffirmed in the agreement that 'neither side shall use force against the other by any means or seek unilateral military support for them'. The visit saw the leaders of the two countries agree to establish Constrictive and Cooperative Partnership between China and India into 21st Century, on basis of Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence'. Four other accords reached during the visit were those relating to maritime transport, cooperation in combating narcotic drug trafficking, improving communication across the border, and maintenance of the Consulate-General of India in Hongkong special Administrative Region .

FIFTH STAGE OF RELATION : Relations after India's Nuclear Bomb 1998 The sunshine period in Sino-Indian relations once again disappeared behind a dark cloud during 1988. In March 1998, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Government came to power in India. The remarks made by the new Defense minister George Fernandez (May 1998) that China was India's main threat caused once again, after the Sumdorongchu incident, a setback to Sino-Indian relations. The atmosphere became tenser after the nuclear test. India conducted five nuclear tests and officially declared herself a new —nuclear weapon state. The Chinese saw the test as —causing serious damage to the bilateral relations. The PRC took stronger objection to PM Vajpayee's letter to US President Clinton, justifying India's decision to test nuclear weapon by pointing to the threat from China and asked for an Indian explanation for considering China as a threat. Beijing also joined the other US Security Council member in passing Resolution No.1172 which condemned the nuclear test by India and Pakistan. China cancelled its decision to participate in the pre-scheduled 1988 meeting of the joint working group alternately held in each country to discuss confidence-building measures. If analysed in pragmatic terms, this was an unwarranted and provocative act on India's part, resulting in unnecessary tension with China. The nuclear issue featured as an irritant in India-China relations for some time, which really put the bilateral relationship in a limbo. However, both countries were able to resume talks once again after a span of nine months. This was made possible by the visits to China made by the Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh in 1999. Both the sides reached a consensus that the prerequisite for restoring and developing Sino-Indian relations, and it was assured that neither side will regard the other as a threat. In May 2000, Indian President K.R Narayan visited China when his Chinese counterpart, Jiang Zemin, put forward a four point proposal concerning the development of bilateral relations in the 21st century.—The two sides enhance the level of bilateral personnel visits to increase mutual understanding and trust; expand trade and economic cooperation; strengthen coordination and cooperation in international affairs; and properly handle issues left over from the past in the spirit of seeking common ground while reserving differences . This is all the more so in the case of India and china, between which high-level visits were imitated only in the 1990s and Atal Behari Vajpayee was only the fourth Indian prime minister to make a state visit to China in 2003. . The visit in June 2003 has further contributed to enhance mutual cooperation between the two countries in diverse fields. During this visit nine agreements were signed with China. With regard to boundary question, PM Vajpayee and his Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabo made references to alignment of the LAC. In addition both the leaders reaffirmed their commitments to the idea of multi polarity. The Declaration, the first such one between the two countries, committed Beijing and New Delhi to develop a 'Long-term Constructive and Cooperative Partnership on the basis of Five Principals of Peaceful Co-Existence, mutual respect, sensitivity for the concerns of each other and equality'. The term 'equality' was applied to India— China relations for the first time.

SIXTH STAGE : At present china has created Doklam issue which create tension between the two neighbor countries. Doklam is a narrow plateau lying in the tri-junction region of Bhutan, China and India. Doklam is situated roughly 15

kilometers southeast of the Nathu La pass that separates India and China . On the western edge of the Doklam plateau is **Doka La**, which connects Sikkim with either Tibet (Chinese Government Claim) or linking Sikkim to western Bhutan (Bhutanese and Indian government Claim. In June 2017, Chinese army attempted to extend a road from Yadong to south of the Doklam plateau. But according to Bhutanese government, China attempted to extend a road that previously terminated at Doka La towards the Bhutan Army camp at Zompelri .According to New Friendship Treaty (Signed between India and Bhutan) it is mandatory for Bhutan to take India's guidance on foreign policy with border sovereignty and not require Bhutan to obtain India's permission over arms imports. So On 18 June, Indian troops crossed into the territory in an attempt to prevent the road construction. India has criticised China for "crossing the border" and attempting to construct a road (allegedly done "illegally"), while China has criticised India for entering its "territory"

2. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS :

Despite gloomy predictions about the inevitability of competition between China and India, cooperation between Asia's two emerging powers is possible. It, will however, require a much more concerted effort to bridge the gap in socio-cultural understanding that existed between them, there remains a fundamental lack of appreciation on the part of each country of the underlying cultural and societal norms that define the other—norms that influence each country's perception of its own national interest. We argue that greater appreciation of these elements is critical if China and India are to successfully address issues such as the ongoing border dispute and the mounting trade imbalance. In present and future scenarios, strategic and diplomatic relations between China and India are fraught with complication, tensions and misgivings on both sides upon the historical legacies of relations between the two countries. Much of the mistrust and misgivings emanate from the legacy of the 1962 war between the two countries. The following five decades have seen generation of Indians growing up with an inherent wariness of China and anything Chinese. This was reflected in the popular phrase that was chanted by Indian children in the 1950s: *Hindi-Chinibhai*, the general atmosphere of bonhomie and friendship was such that most Indians could not imagine the advent of Chinese military aggression on their relative unguarded northeast frontier. Without going into the details of the 1962 misadventure, it suffices to say that they caused a dent in the national psyche of India, that lurks uncomfortably in the background even today. There was a freezing of diplomatic relations after the 1962 conflagration, which only thawed in 1976 when relations were tentatively restored. From 1976 to the present, the salient features of bilateral diplomatic negotiations has been the cloak of confidentiality and secrecy maintained by the government and key negotiation on both sides. By far the most vexing issue has been the demarcation and resolution of the boundary line denoting the border between the two countries. To further complicate the issue, while there appears to be a tacit understanding of mutual respecting a notional Line of Actual Control (LAC) between the two countries, there has been precious little achieved in terms of actually defining this LAC on the ground , high-level diplomatic and strategic meetings and negotiations over the past few decades might suggest that serious headway has been made in resolving some of these core issues.

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